


3 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence ~~+~~

SUBJECT : CIA's Principal Weaknesses Today

In my opinion one method by which the Inspector General can contribute to the welfare of the Agency is to periodically review for you its weaknesses. This review does not purport to be a thorough analysis of each of the problems mentioned. The office inspections which this staff conducts go into detail. It should be noted that problems are mentioned in areas where this Staff has not inspected, but of which we are aware through individual cases or direct knowledge. This is particularly true of the DD/P area. I have listed these weaknesses in the order that I consider them to be the greatest threat to the future of the Agency--with the most serious first

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

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comments on it.*

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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3. Proximity of CIA to Policy.

To my mind, the danger of CIA getting too close to or becoming involved in policy-making represents one of the most potentially dangerous situations facing the Agency. History is replete with intelligence-security agencies getting near the apex of power in governments and being eliminated. CIA's work is too important to the future of the United States to permit any such setback to the development of a professional intelligence service.

Three factors contribute to CIA's being drawn into the mechanism of policy-making: (a) the constant presence of a CIA Deputy Director on the NSC Planning Board where actually the Department of State should be the dominant voice on any given world situation and should be brought in only as a technical, operational or emergency advisor; (b) the split personality of CIA which at one moment is reporting intelligence-wise on a given situation and at the same time is action-wise capable of attempting to clandestinely change that situation; (c) the fact that CIA since its inception has had an exceptionally able group of energetic and imaginative senior officials who have had a natural tendency to move into the vacuums created by inertia in old-line agencies.

But two major dangers lurk behind CIA's closeness to policy. The Agency faces considerable hostility in Washington because of its preeminent position in intelligence. This hostility will be overcome only by the recognition over a period of time of CIA's capability in its assigned field--intelligence. It will increase if CIA invades an even more sacrosanct premise--policy. Secondly, CIA faces all it can cope with in servicing the inevitable intelligence failures. It will have more than it can handle if it must also share in the responsibility for command decisions.

Recommendation: That a review be made of the position of CIA on the NSC Planning Board, and that an Agency policy be prepared in writing on the position of CIA officials in discussions with policy-making officials.

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5. Handling of Personnel.

This Agency is still far from out of the woods in its handling of personnel. Certain progress was made during 1954, but personnel management nevertheless remains a serious internal weakness. The Career Service Program was launched. The Assistant Director for Personnel took over the career service program. Some offices commenced career planning. A good course was developed by Training to help improve supervisors.

On the other side of the ledger, too many personnel are returning from overseas without any knowledge of their next assignment. I have personally talked with top-level Agency personnel (GS-11 and above) who have been in Washington on temporary duty and indicated that they had sought information on their next assignment to no avail. Even though the Agency has an alleged clerical shortage, there are too many instances of clerical personnel waiting for an assignment or shopping for a position.

The career service system is too cumbersome. For example, one GS-15 officer was transferred from this staff to WH Division at the request of the Chief of that Division. The transfer took place in September 1954, and the appropriate paper initiated at that time. Approval of the appropriate career service board was not received until January 1955. This slowness is not only ineffecient but can have a serious effect on employee morale.

Perhaps the biggest problem in the Agency is still the failure of supervisors to carry out their responsibilities in the field of personnel management. Most pertinent today is the fact that few supervisors are taking an aggressive approach to the elimination of mediocre personnel. They are also not doing their part in placement, promotion and career development. While the Personnel Office is responsible for the mechanical servicing of these actions, the supervisors are responsible for prompt and human handling.

It should also be noted that whereas in the latter part of 1953 and the first part of 1954 the CIA Career Service Board met a minimum of once a week, the new Career Council has met less than once a month since its creation. What this means is that the tremendous impetus given to the career service program by the persistent attention of the most powerful and influential board in the Agency has been lost and the program is drifting like a rudderless ship.

Recommendation: That the DD/S be instructed to reorganize the Personnel Office so as to correct these shortcomings.

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7. Existence of Three Independent Offices.

There are historical reasons why the Offices of Communications, Personnel and Training were either broken out from under particular Deputy Directors or created from smaller components and given an independent status. These reasons, which incidentally were strongly influenced by personalities, are no longer valid.

The existence of three independent offices in addition to the three Deputy Directors is organizationally unsound. The DDCI should be the alter ego to the DCI. With three Deputy Directors, the Inspector General and the Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination reporting to the Director from within, plus membership on IAC, OCB, NSC and USCIB and high-level liaison with State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs and the White House on the outside, there is more than enough for the DCI and DDCI to handle without worrying about three independent offices. It should also be recognized that the three independent offices also create additional liaison and coordination burdens on the staffs of the DD/A, DD/P and DD/I. Further, while the importance of the functions of these three offices is by no means underestimated, they are by no stretch of the imagination comparable to the importance of DD/A, DD/I and DD/P.

Recommendation: The DD/A should be the principal support officer in CIA--men, money and material. The offices of Communications, Training and Personnel should be placed under DD/A.

8. Division in Responsibility for Training.

CIA can point with pride to its Office of Training. This Office had a fine heritage from the OSO training section. It has developed good courses for the DD/I and support personnel. It has done a good public relations job in awakening the operating components to the necessity of assigning good personnel to the Office of Training as instructors. Isolation is close to being a model installation.

But Training's great reservoir of talent, training aids and techniques, and general know-how are not being utilized by the operating divisions for the training of agents. While it is true that the vital relationship of case officer to agent should not be disturbed by giving Training any command authority, it is also true that CIA would have both better case officers and better agents if Training's full facilities were utilized.

A problem faced by this Agency since its creation has been that created by an unsatisfactory case officer-agent relationship. This has been caused by using immature, often inexperienced, and occasionally untrained case officers to handle older, experienced, and generally mercenary agents. In many instances the case officer has been ill-equipped in the language required which has further lessened the possibility of properly controlling the agent. The result has been that in many instances agents have been running our case officers.

While it is true that the Office of Training could not give age or experience to our case officer, much could be accomplished by broadening the responsibility of this office to include the field of agent training.

Recommendation: That while the area divisions retain responsibility for the recruitment and training of agents and the assignment of case officers, the Office of Training be charged with the staff supervision of all agent training to include certification that the case officer is able to handle the agent and the agent has been trained to the best ability of the Agency.

9. Split Responsibilities of the DD/I.

Regardless of the capabilities of the DD/I as an individual, it is not a satisfactory arrangement to have the same person act as CIA representative to the NSC Planning Board and as DD/I. Further, the command responsibilities inherent in the DD/I position cannot but be neglected if the same individual has other major responsibilities.

It has become increasingly apparent to the staff of the Inspector General in surveying the intelligence offices that the DD/I was not able to give the type of leadership required. This was especially true in the case of OSI where a critical situation had been allowed to develop that should never had occurred if the DD/I had been giving that office at least a sixth of his time--an amount certainly commensurate to its importance. The other five offices of the DD/I also reflect the same situation.

Recommendation: That representation on the NSC Planning Board be transferred to the Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination where it more logically belongs.

10. Executive Direction of CIA.

This is a subject on which I feel less strongly than on any of the other nine mentioned. It is presented here specifically because I am certain that the Clark Report will mention it. CIA has no Chief of Staff or Executive Director.

The advocates for a Chief of Staff state: the Director and Deputy Director make policy, conduct high-level external liaison and direct the Agency's work; the Deputy Directors and independent Assistant Directors conduct the work of their respective components; there should be a Chief of Staff or Executive Director to see that orders and policies of the Director are carried out and that the Agency runs properly. This is a position that the military services rely upon very heavily.

There is no question but that an Executive Director would relieve the DCI and DDCI of many burdens of Agency administration and operations. The creation of this position would also insure greater intra-Agency coordination and better staff work. On the other hand, it should be recognized that the creation of this position would add another echelon to the top hierarchy.

Recommendation: That the Management Staff be instructed to survey CIA organization and determine whether an Executive Director is required.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

DCI---

Please note my comments in pencil. I believe this would be a useful vehicle for distribution to the three Deputies and then a discussion on the items at an early Deputies meeting.

/s/
CPC - DDCI

LBK:rm

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Recommendation: That a review be made of the position of CIA on the NSC Planning Board, and that an Agency policy be prepared in writing on the position of CIA officials in discussions with policy-making officials.

Agree only to the extent that this is an argument for care in our conduct in these encounters and is not to question the necessity for our presence and participation in the policy making process under proper restraints, self-imposed and otherwise.

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